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NOTES

Austin, Nichols & Co., Inc. v. Gross,"° in which case the defendant
had signed a check with his individual name without adding words
to indicate any representative capacity, the name of the corporation
being printed across the left end of the check. Nevertheless, the defendant was allowed to show that he signed on behalf of the corporation as an authorized agent.
Hence it would seem that, in view of such a liberal holding, the
fact that the signature of the agent is not indented beneath the corporate name should not be sufficient to deprive the signature of its
ambiguous appearance.
That the Herman Appellate Court case is poor authority is further
borne out by the fact that it refuses to consider the effect of the word
"by." This is directly contrary to the provision of Section 20 of the
Act of 1907, the first part of which provides that:
"Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature
words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of the principal or in a
representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly
authorized."
That part of the section certainly intends to give effect to such words
as "by." Nevertheless, the Herman case states that:
".
. the word 'by' portends nothing and must be treated as if it
was not there. The note is the obligation of the three defendants, the
corporation, Zimmerman, and Nat Rue."
In conclusion, it appears that the Herman case is out of line with
the authorities; that it has confused the principle of not admitting
parol evidence to vary the terms of an instrument with the principle
admitting extrinsic evidence to explain an ambiguity in an instrument;
that it has ignored the distinction pointed out in the Hypes case, on
which its reasoning is principally based; that it has ignored the Scanlon
case, and that it has also ignored the significance of the first part of
Section 20 of the Illinois Negotiable Instruments Law.
MALCOLM S. BARTON.
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION-EFFECT IN A CIVIL CASE AS RES

JUDICATA OR AS EVIDENCE.-[New York] A case' recently decided
by the New York Court of Appeals presents several interesting questions. In a suit on an insurance policy the answer set out a provision
of the policy avoiding liability in case of any fraud by the insured,
and, as a bar to the action, the conviction of the insured of the statutory offense of making fraudulent proofs of loss under such policy.
This attempted defense was struck out by the trial court, and the
ruling affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals with
some reluctance affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, and
suggested:
"The Legislature can get over the authorities by enacting that all
convictions shall be conclusive evidence of the guilt of the convicted person
in any proceeding, civil or criminal, whoever may be parties, for the purpose of establishing whenever material the facts on which the conviction
rests. The court might so decide were the occasion imperative and the
10. (Conn. 1923) 120 Atl. 596; Brannan "Negotiable Instruments Law"
(4th ed.) 169, 170.
1. Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co. (1932) 258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711.
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necessity clear, but established precedents are not to be lightly set aside,
even though they seem archaic."
The opinion then goes on to approve the doctrine of the Crippen
case 2 in which it was held that a judgment of conviction of a criminal
offense was admissible against the convict and those claiming under
him as "presumptive proof" of his actual guilt.
So far as the actual decision goes little comment is needed because
it is in accord with the great mass of decisions that a judgment of
conviction does not conclude the convict in a subsequent civil action
between him and a stranger, as to the existence of the facts on which
the prosecution was based. The doctrine of stare decisis has settled
beyond controversy that a judgment inter partes is only binding in
subsequent actions between the same parties and those claiming under
them; and that a stranger who is not bound by the adjudication cannot
invoke it as binding on his adversary.
The Court of Appeals was amply justified in following the almost
unbroken line of precedents, though one late case8 took a contrary
view and apparently held that the conviction of the insured on a
charge of burning the insured property barred his action on the policy.
Where the former judgment has been rendered in a civil case it has
never been seriously contended that it should be binding in favor of a
stranger, but the argument for the binding effect of a criminal conviction is based on the rule that in criminal prosecutions the necessary facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and hence that
it is certain that the defendant was really guilty. It is doubtless true
that comparatively few innocent defendants are convicted, though
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt may mean very
little. It makes it easy for jurors to acquit where sympathy inclines
them to do so, but it is extremely doubtful whether this theoretical
requirement leads to any more careful consideration of the evidence
in the cases where the jury does find the defendant guilty. There are
numerous cases in the books where convictions have been reversed
because the evidence was insufficient to warrant a submission of the
case to the jury.
If a miscarriage of justice has occurred in a criminal case it
would work a double hardship to make this adjudication binding in
civil matters in favor of strangers. On the other hand a plaintiff or
defendant in a civil case who is required to prove the existence of
the facts on which his claim or defense is based, without regard to the
accidental circumstance that the State has succeeded in establishing
the existence of the same facts in a prosecution of the adverse party,
is under no greater burden than any other party in an ordinary case.
In this connection it should be noted that convictions sometimes
affect civil rights and liabilities, and that such cases do not involve any
question of res judicata. For example, if a life insurance policy is
construed as excepting death by legal execution, the conviction and
execution of the insured 4will bar an action by the beneficiary without
regard to the actual guit of the insured.
2.
3.
140 S.
4.

Matter of Crippen's Estate, L. R. [1911] Prob. 108.
Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller (1927) 149 Va. 82,
E. 314, 57 A. L. R. 490 annotated.
Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1902) 187 U. S. 362.
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So the conviction and execution of the insured is not an "accident !" within the meaning of an accident policy.
A more interesting question is raised by the suggestion that the
legislature might make the conviction conclusive in any case no matter
who the parties were. Doubtless there would be no serious objection
to a statute making the conviction conclusive against the convict and
those deriving rights from him, since he would have had his day in
court. But there is room for doubt as to whether such a statute would
not violate the "Due Process" clause if applied to controversies between strangers. Suppose, for example, that A should be convicted
of the murder of B who was insured against death by accident. Could
the insurance company be foreclosed from a defense that it was really
a case of suicide? In such a case the defendant company has never
had its day in court. The reasoning in the Duchess of Kingston's Case

would indicate that the judges thought that it was contrary to natural
justice to conclude a party without an opportunity to be heard.
The Act0 of Congress of March 31, 1875, undertook to make a
conviction of larceny conclusive in the prosecution of another person
for receiving stolen property. In a case7 prosecuted under this statute
the trial court instructed that the conviction of the alleged thief was
prima facie evidence of the larceny as against the alleged receiver, but
the Supreme Court held that this violated the defendant's right to be
confronted with the witnesses to prove one of the esssential elements
of the crime charged against him. While the due process clause was
not invoked, the case is at least suggestive as to limitations on the
power of the legislature to make a judgment of conviction binding on
third persons. If the court was unwilling to hold the conviction
binding on the convict should it sanction the evidential use of the
judgment to prove the existence of the facts on which it was based?
For the collateral purpose of impairing the credibility of a witness
the courts have usually felt no difficulty in admitting a judgment convicting him of a felony or other serious crime.8 The theory involved
is certainly that the conviction proves his actual guilt, and therefore9
tends to show that he is the sort of a person likely to be untruthful.
Possibly the admission of a conviction for this purpose is a more or
less unconscious carry over from the time when a conviction disqualified the witness.
As proof of matter in issue in a case the great weight of authority, both ancient and modern, is clearly against the admissibility' 0 of
a judgment of conviction of either party. While the reason usually
assigned for this rule, the lack of mutuality, is not very convincing,
there are several serious objections to admissibility. For the purpose
of proving the facts on which it is based the admission of the conviction seems counter to both the hearsay rule and the opinion rule.
The finding of the jury is obviously nothing more than their conclusion from the testimony produced at the trial. It is clear that the
5. Diamond v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1931) 50 F. (2d) 884.
6. 18 Stat. at Large 479.
7. Kirby v. United States (1899) 174 U. S. 47.
8. Rex v. Warden of the Fleet (1700) 12 Mod. 337.

9. Gertz v. Fitchburg R. R. Co. (1884) 137 Mass. 77.

10. Rex v. Warden of the Fleet (1700) 12 Mod. 337; Rostron v. Rostron
(R.I. 1928) 142 AtI. 162; Page v. Phelps (1928) 108 Conn. 572; Montgomery

v. Crum (Ind. 1928) 161 N. E. 251; Girardv. Vermont Fire Ins. Co. (Vt. 1931)

154 At. 666.
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individual jurors would not be admitted to testify to their belief in
the guilt of the accused because of their lack of personal knowledge.
Their formal verdict would seem to be no better than their present
testimony. It is true that there are some precedents for admitting
the verdict of a coroner's jury" to 2prove the cause of death, but that
view has generally been repudiated.
If the hearsay rule and the opinion rule could be brushed aside
as technical obstacles to progress, there remains a purely practical
objection. When we admit evidence to a jury we assume that their
general knowledge and experience will enable them to determine
roughly at least its probative force-in the metaphor of the courts, to
weigh it and balance it against other evidence. Privately we may
doubt the capacity of the jury to evaluate ordinary evidence. We may
be skeptical as to whether they really attempt it in the majority of
cases. We may suspect that most verdicts represent a "hunch" or a
compromise in which logic and experience played a minor r6le. But
if we give the jury an impossible task the case might as well be decided by the toss of coin. Manifestly there is no way in a given
case of determining the probative value of a conviction to establish
the truth of the propositions on which it was based. If there were
no other evidence we might indulge in a presumption and so settle
the matter. But if there is other evidence on the questions what effect
should be given to the fact that another jury on an unknown state
of the evidence arrived at a given conclusion? The present jury, if
it really considers the matter, must either blindly accept the conclusion of the first jury or ignore it because there is no rational
alternative. Few courts today would approve an instruction telling
a jury to weigh a "presumption" with or against evidence, for the
simple reason that the thing is impossible. Any attempt to weigh the
conviction involves the same difficulty. It Would seem therefore that
the "archaic" precedents may not be so bad after all.
E. W. HINTON.
11. United States Life Ins. Co. v. Vocke (1889) 129 Ill. 557.
12. Spiegel House Furnishing Co. v. Ind. Comm. (1919) 288 Ill. 422. Bird
v. Keep [1918] 2 K. B. D. 692.

